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The Drivers of Chinese CO2 Emissions from 1980 to 2030 
 
 
Abstract 
China’s energy consumption doubled within the first 25 years of economic reforms initiated 
at the end of the 1970s, and doubled again in the past 5 years. It has resulted of a threefold 
CO2 emissions increase since early of 1980s. China’s heavy reliance on coal will make it the 
largest emitter of CO2 in the world. By combining structural decomposition and input-output 
analysis we seek to assess the driving forces of China’s CO2 emissions from 1980 to 2030. In 
our reference scenario, production-related CO2 emissions will increase another three times by 
2030. Household consumption, capital investment and growth in exports will largely drive the 
increase in CO2 emissions. Efficiency gains will be partially offset the projected increases in 
consumption, but our scenarios show that this will not be sufficient if China’s consumption 
patterns converge to current US levels. Relying on efficiency improvements alone will not 
stabilize China’s future emissions. Our scenarios show that even extremely optimistic 
assumptions of widespread installation of carbon dioxide capture and storage will only slow 
the increases in CO2 emissions. 
 
Keywords: CO2 emissions, China, Climate Change, Sustainable Consumption, Lifestyles, 
Input-Output Analysis, Structural Decomposition Analysis, Carbon Capture and Storage.  
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1 Introduction 
Rapid growth in gross domestic production since the 1980s has made China the fourth-largest 
economy and the third-largest exporter in the world as of mid-2006 (World Trade 
Organization, 2007). Economic success has brought wealth to its population while at the same 
time creating the world’s largest income inequality between rural and urban dwellers (Li and 
Yue, 2004). In major cities, many urban Chinese are pursuing western, consumerist lifestyles 
while 27% of its rural population is still earning less than $1 per day measured in purchasing 
power parity (PPP) and 70% earning less than $2 per day (National Bureau of Statistics, 
2007c). 
 
China’s booming economy, especially in manufacturing sectors, has driven rapid growth in 
energy consumption. Total energy consumption doubled from 603 million tons of coal 
equivalent (tce)1 in 1980 to about 1,200 million tce in 2002 and, strikingly, doubled again in 
the past 4 years (National Bureau of Statistics, 2007b). China’s overall energy intensity has 
significantly improved from 4.3 tce per 10,000 2002 Renminbi (RMB) of gross domestic 
production (GDP) in 1980 to a low of 1.3 tce per 10,000 RMB in 2002, although China’s 
energy intensity increased to 1.4 tce per 10,000 RMB in 2006. The energy intensity in 2006 is 
more than 9 times higher than Japan and 3.4 times higher than the USA measured in market 
exchange rates (MER)2. Furthermore, China’s energy mix has not changed significantly. In 
the early 1980s, coal accounted for 71% of total energy consumption. It dropped to its lowest 
point of 66% in 2002, but by 2006, it had climbed back to 70% (National Bureau of Statistics, 
2007b). Some scholars have debated the authenticity of the drop in coal consumption around 
2000 (Akimoto et al., 2006; Sinton, 2001). 
 
Using the most recent official Chinese energy data (National Bureau of Statistics, 2007b) we 
estimate that China’s total CO2 emissions3 in 2006 were approximately 5,670 million metric 
tons (MMT) which is slightly lower than the US estimate of 5,955 MMT (EIA, 2007). The 
                                                 
1 1 tce = 29 gigajoules (GJ). 
2 MER refers to GDP valued exclusively at Market Exchange Rates. Energy intensity represents the amount of energy 
consumed to produce one unit of GDP. However there are two ways to measure GDP, either by using MER or PPP. The 
energy intensities in this paper are measured as energy consumed per 10,000 2002 RMB of GDP, valued according to the 
MER. The difference in measuring energy intensity between by MER and PPP for China is substantial. For example, China’s 
energy intensity is more than 3 times than the US level measure by MER, but if measured by PPP, the figures between China 
and US are quite similar. MER does not give a true indication of wealth and PPP is often used to measure GDP, but is less 
appropriate when speaking of internationally traded goods. For our purpose, we only intend to give an indication of the 
variation in emission intensity between countries.  
3 Production-related CO2 emissions refer to all CO2 emissions released due to burning fuels and process emissions by 
smelting metals, cements and some chemicals.  
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Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency (2007) reported that China overtook the US 
as the world’s largest CO2 emitter in 2006 and given China’s faster growth rates, we also 
would expect China to overtake the US sometime in 2007 or 2008 (Gregg et al., 2008). 
Nevertheless, despite the absolute emissions levels, China’s per capita emissions are much 
lower than those of other developed countries (Hubacek et al., 2007).  
 
In addition to being a major contributor to global climate change, China is one of the 
countries most likely to be severely affected. Global sea level rose an average of 1.5 
millimeters per year over the past 50 years (IPCC, 2007). If emissions of CO2 and other green 
house gases (GHGs) continue at the current rate, average sea level would rise 20-60 
centimeters by end of the century (IPCC, 2007). Impacts would include salt-water intrusion, 
which would threaten the water supply of China’s coastal mega-cities including Shanghai and 
Guangzhou and affect tens of millions of people (IPCC, 2007).  
 
Thus, it is crucial for both Chinese and global climate and energy policy to understand the key 
driving forces of China’s growing energy consumption and greenhouse gas emissions. We 
extend the Impact = Population × Affluence × Technology (IPAT) model (Commoner et al., 
1971; Ehrlich and Holdren, 1971) by using structural decomposition analysis (Leontief and 
Ford, 1972; Rose and Casler, 1996) to assess the key drivers of China’s CO2 emissions since 
its economic reforms, first initiated at the end of 1978, and to develop three illustrative 
scenarios to describe potential levels of China’s CO2 emissions in 2030.  
 
The IPAT equation was developed in the 1970s (Ehrlich and Holdren, 1971) to explain the 
environmental effects of population, affluence (usually measured in GDP per capita), and 
technology (usually measured in emissions per unit GDP), and to project future 
environmental change based on changes in these main driving forces (Commoner, 1972; 
Dietz and Rosa, 1997; York et al., 2002). One of the key limitations of IPAT and its variants 
is that the model can only assess the direct impacts on the environment caused by these 
driving forces. Furthermore, it is too aggregated to clearly allocate the sources of emissions to 
particular industries or consumers (Chertow, 2001). The limitations of the IPAT model can be 
overcome using input-output (IO) analysis (Hertwich, 2005). Input-output analysis is a 
suitable tool to evaluate both direct and indirect environmental impacts by examining the flow 
of goods and services among the producing and purchasing sectors of a country or region 
(Leontief, 1986). By adopting this approach, the IPAT variable affluence can be represented 
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by a disaggregated final demand which accounts for household consumption in sectoral detail; 
the variable technology is better described by the Leontief inverse matrix which captures the 
inter-linkages between all economic sectors. 
 
Just as the standard IPAT analysis decomposes changes over time into components for 
population, affluence, and technology, using input-output analysis the main driving forces can 
be divided into more detailed subcomponents by employing a technique called structural 
decomposition analysis (SDA) (Hoekstra, 2005). Rose and Casler (1996, p34) define SDA as 
an “analysis of economic change by means of a set of comparative static changes in key 
parameters in an input-output table.” The first application of SDA to environmental issues 
can be traced back to the early 1970s (Leontief and Ford, 1972). Most earlier SDA studies 
focused on energy consumption and its related emissions in developed countries or regions 
(see Hoekstra and van der Bergh, 2002). SDA studies have been performed for China 
(Andresosso-O'Callaghan and Yue, 2002; Garbaccio et al., 1999; Lin and Polenske, 1995); the 
most recent by Peters et al. (2007) concluded that the increase in China’s CO2 emissions from 
1992 to 2002 were mainly driven by capital investment and household consumption, which 
were only partly offset by efficiency gains and technical change in production. They also 
found that the rapid growth in exports had been tempered by a growth in imports. Until now, 
there are no studies that assess the drivers of China’s CO2 emissions from its economic 
reform at the early of 1980s to the present.  
 
The combination of IO-IPAT and SDA strengthens the standard IPAT analysis by identifying 
which economic sectors and final consumers drive changes. We use IO-IPAT and SDA to 
decompose the key drivers behind increased Chinese CO2 emissions from 1981 to 2002. We 
then forecast Chinese CO2 emissions in 2030 using three illustrative scenarios: (i) a reference 
case, (ii) increased demand driven by rapidly westernizing lifestyles, and (iii) greater 
penetration of low-carbon technology through adoption of carbon dioxide capture and storage 
(CCS) technologies. We draw several recommendations for China’s climate change policy 
based on past experiences and future trends in population, economic growth, lifestyle changes, 
and technology improvements. 
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2 Method and Data 
The principal formula for IO-IPAT SDA can be illustrated as CO2 vyp ⋅⋅⋅⋅= syLF
2ΔCO −
1)(t1)(t1)(t1)(t1)(t(t)(t)(t)(t)(t) −−−−−
. CO2 
emissions can be decomposed into five driving forces: population (p), emission intensity (F), 
economic production structure (L), consumption pattern (ys) and per capita consumption 
volume (yv). Bold notation denotes matrices (capitals) and vectors. The change in CO2 
emissions from time t-1 to time t can be decomposed into changes in the component driving 
forces, but there is no unique solution for the decomposition; the five factors utilized in this 
paper have 5!=120 first-order decompositions (Dietzenbacher and Los, 1998). One of the 120 
possible decompositions is shown in Equation 1.  
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Each of the four terms in Equation (1) represents the contribution to change in CO2 emissions 
triggered by one driving force with keeping the rest of variables constant. For example, the 
first term ― Δ  represents the change in CO2 emissions due to changes in 
population, with all other variables (F, L, ys and yv) remaining constant. This also serves to 
highlight a methodological issue with SDA – non-uniqueness. For instance, in the fourth term 
F, L, ys and yv can be evaluated at the start or the end-point of the time-period investigated. 
There are several methods for dealing with this issue. We average all possible first-order 
decompositions; for a detailed discussion see Hoekstra & van der Bergh (2002).  
 
This study requires two sets of data: time-series input-output tables and the corresponding 
energy and CO2 emissions data. We employed China’s input-output tables (IOT) from Li and 
Xue  (1998) for 1981, 1983, 1987, 1990, 1992, 1995. They edited the six tables with 18 
sectors in 1990 price. We obtained the input-output tables from the Chinese National Bureau 
of Statistics (NBS) for 1997 with 40 sectors (National Bureau of Statistics, 1999), 2000 with 
40 sectors (National Bureau of Statistics, 2002) and 2002 with 42 sectors (National Bureau of 
Statistics, 2006). These three tables were in current prices. However, there was considerable 
overlap in the classifications. All the tables are aggregated to a uniform classification with 18 
sectors (see production sectors at Table 1) in 1990 price using the double deflation method 
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(United Nations, 1999). The Chinese input-output tables include several categories of final 
consumption: rural and urban households, government, total capital formation, exports and 
imports. 
 
The energy data for 1981-2002 were extracted from the China Energy Databook published by 
Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory (2004). The complete dataset consists of 18 types of 
fuel, heat, and electricity consumption in physical units. CO2 emissions including both the 
combustion of fuels and industrial processes were calculated using the IPCC reference 
approach (IPCC, 2006). The energy and emissions data for all years comprise 37 production 
sectors and 2 households sectors (urban and rural). Energy data were normalized to harmonize 
the sectors between the input-output tables and the energy/CO2 data when performing the 
analysis. We also extracted energy data for 2005 and 2006 from the China Energy Statistical 
Yearbook 2006 (National Bureau of Statistics, 2007a) and China’s Statistical Yearbook 2007 
(National Bureau of Statistics, 2007b) to track the most recent trends in CO2 emissions in 
China and use the data as the reference for projections to 2030. 
 
 
3 IO-IPAT SDA results from 1981 to 2002 
Our IO-IPAT SDA results broadly show a competition between GDP growth and efficiency 
gains over the past two decades in Figure 1. The increase in GDP per capita, “Δyv” (light blue 
line) would have increased production-related CO2 emissions by 469% from 1981 if 
population, efficiency, economic structure and consumption patterns had stayed constant at 
1981 levels. Similarly, efficiency gains (red line) would have offset total CO2 emissions by 
425% of 1981 levels if the other factors remained constant. The change in population (blue 
line) would lead to a 72% increase in total CO2 emissions; the change in household 
consumption patterns (purple line) would contribute 42% to the increase and change in 
economic production structure (green line) would contribute 45%. In total, the emission 
increased 202%, or from 1,346MMT to 3,623MMT, during 1981-2002 period. Since 2002, 
Chinese emissions have grown another 50% to reach 5,400 in2006 
 
It is possible to further decompose the growth in GDP by the different final users. The bar 
chart in Figure 2 allocates the total increase in CO2 emissions to the separate final demand 
categories. Of the 2,277 MMT (202%) increase in CO2 emissions from 1981 to 2002: 1,174 
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MMT (52%) was due to the growth in fixed capital investments; 944 MMT (42%) was due to 
household consumption – of which 856 MMT (38%) was from urban households and only 88 
MMT (4%) from rural households – and 229 MMT (10%) resulted from government 
consumption. China’s CO2 emissions rose 43% to produce exports for other countries’ needs. 
If it is assumed that all the imports to China are produced with Chinese technology, imports 
would temper this emission by 46%. However, given China’s high use of coal in electricity 
production and inefficient production systems relative to those nations exporting goods to 
China, this assumption largely overestimates the actual embodied CO2 in China’s imports 
(Peters and Hertwich, 2008a). Peters and Hertwich (2008a) found that the actual emissions 
embodied in Chinese imports were almost four times lower than the emissions embodied in 
Chinese exports.  
 
The left pie chart of Figure 2 illustrates the top consumption items of urban households and 
the associated increases in CO2 emissions to produce these items. Of the 877 MMT increase 
in CO2 emissions due to urban household consumption, the major components are electricity 
(26%), agriculture (8%) and services (36%), which can be further split into 18% from public 
transport, 9% from trade, restaurants and hotels, and 7% from freight transport, post, and 
telecommunication services.   
 
The vastly improved living standard since the economic reforms has allowed many urban 
households to ‘westernize’ their lifestyles. Changing lifestyles have resulted in rapid growth 
in direct energy consumption4, from less than 6 million tce in 1981 to 235 million tce in 2005.  
Electricity demand has significantly increased both directly, through the use of household 
electrical appliances, and indirectly, through the production of goods. Consumption of 
household electrical appliances quickly increased in both quantity and category since 1990. 
For example, ownership of refrigerators and color television sets in urban areas has more than 
doubled from 40 and 60 sets per 100 urban households in 1990 to 80 and 130 sets in 2005, 
respectively (Hubacek et al., 2007). Air-conditioners and personal computers have become 
essential household items for many urban families. A similar situation is observable for 
telecommunication services; mobile phones are very popular in urban China; the average 
urban household had 1.37 sets in 2005 (National Bureau of Statistics, 2007b). On the other 
hand, owning a car is still an unachievable goal for the vast majority of households. But 
                                                 
4 Direct energy consumption consists of all residential energy consumption (e.g. lighting, cooking, energy for appliances etc) 
and fuels for private transportation.  
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despite this fact, one can already observe a trend of the car replacing traditional ways of 
commuting (e.g. walking, cycling, or by bus). This future trend will result in a boom of car 
production and other automotive-related sectors, inevitably leading to a further increase in 
CO2 emissions from car use, car production, and building roads.  
 
The right pie chart of Figure 2 illustrates the top five sectors causing increases in CO2 
emissions in fixed capital investment: construction and machinery production contribute 63% 
and 33%, respectively; the remaining 4% are shared among service sectors. Since the 
economic reforms, the government has paid special attention to infrastructure construction. 
Annual fixed capital investments in the construction sector have increased 6 times in 25 years 
(National Bureau of Statistics, 2007b). As a result, the length of highways extended from 
900,000 in 1981 to 1,700,000 kilometers in 2002 (National Bureau of Statistics, 2007b). The 
number of civil airports similarly increased from 94 in 1990 to 141 by 2002 (National Bureau 
of Statistics, 2007b). 
 
 
4 Scenario design and results 
Building on the historical analysis and on current projections of the different driving forces 
affecting Chinese CO2 emissions, we construct several scenarios to illustrate potential levels 
of Chinese emissions in 2030. We first construct a reference scenario on the future 
development of China’s energy, economic, and social conditions through 2030. We adopt 
2002 as the base year for all economic and social factors and 2005 for the energy 
consumption patterns and volume, since at the time of writing 2002 was the most up-to-date 
input-output table and 2005 was the most up-to-date energy data available. The reference 
scenario is built around the reference scenarios of the International Energy Agency (2007)  
 
We further propose two extreme scenarios – ‘westernizing lifestyles’ and ‘carbon capture and 
storage’ scenarios, in order to estimate the maximum extent that these two important factors, 
lifestyle and technology improvements, could influence China’s future CO2 emissions. 
Scenarios will always be open to debate as they are attempting to model the unknown. A 
scenario must be closely related to the question being asked. It is unlikely that the two 
scenarios we consider will be met in reality, but even so, the scenarios do serve as relevant 
illustrations. Both these scenarios should be seen as what-if thought experiments rather than 
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predictions. The ‘westernizing lifestyles’ scenario reflects how China’s CO2 emissions could 
develop in a ‘worst case’ situation where China continues its current trend in adopting 
western lifestyle, while the ‘carbon capture and storage’ scenario reflects a best-case scenario 
of the implementation of the technology. The scenarios therefore reflect potential upper and 
lower bounds of different policy directions.   
 
4.1 Reference scenario: 
Economic growth: Due to spectacular growth over a sustained period, China’s GDP growth 
has averaged 9.5% per year over the past two decades, accelerating to around 11% in 2006 
and the first half of 2007. In the reference scenario, we use similar assumptions to those of the 
International Energy Agency, China’s annual GDP per capita growth rate averages 8.4% per 
year until 2010, slowing to 5.0% from 2010-2030 (International Energy Agency, 2007, 
Chapter 7). Rapid growth has cut poverty dramatically since early of 1980s, yet China’s per-
capita income is still less than one-quarter of the OECD average today (International Energy 
Agency, 2007, Chapter 7). Income differences are striking between rural and urban areas and 
the gap is likely to remain in the coming decades. This scenario assumes that urban per capita 
income would increase by 5.7% annually from 2002 to 2010, and 4.7% annually from 2010 to 
2030. A similar, slightly slower, trend would occur in rural households, where per capita 
income would increase by 5.2% per year until 2010 and 4.2% from 2010 to 2030 
(International Energy Agency, 2007, Chapter 7).  
 
Population dynamics and urbanization: At 1.32 billion people (in 2002), China has the largest 
population in the world – a fifth of the total. Since the “one-child” policy was put in force in 
1979, China has maintained a low fertility-rate with the average woman having 1.7 children in 
her lifetime. Households in China will thus become older and smaller in the next two decades. 
The retired population will more than double by 2030 (International Energy Agency, 2007, 
Chapter 7). In order to delay the aging of their society, the Chinese government in July 2007 
announced a new version of its population policy. One of the important decisions is that in 
“all Chinese provinces … except for Henan, couples in which both are the only child can 
themselves give birth to two children” (Xinhua, 2007, own translation). This revised scenario 
projected that China’s population would reach 1.5 billion by 2030, compared to 1.45 billion 
projected by United Nation (2004) under the previous “one-child” policy. The urbanization 
rate would reach 61% by 2030, increasing from 39% in 2002 (United Nations, 2004). 
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 Changing consumption patterns: For 2002, consumption patterns for urban and rural 
households were taken from the 2002 input-output table. We adopted sector-specific income 
elasticities of demand and per-capita income estimations to project people’s consumption 
patterns in 2030 for rural and urban households (Hubacek and Sun, 2001). The income 
elasticity measures the rate of response of quantity demand due to a raise in a consumer’s 
income. Table 1 shows the employed income elasticities for projecting Chinese household 
consumption in 2030. Hubacek and Sun (2001; 2005) modified the income elasticities to 
project Chinese consumption in 2025 based on the estimates and calibrations in Huang and 
Rozelle (1998) and Huang and Chen (1999), and on their own adjustments to accommodate 
the sectoral setup in the input-output model. Consumption patterns for both urban and rural 
residents would change significantly. For example, the share of consumption expenditures for 
food and other related agricultural products would decrease from 39% and 21% in 2002 to 
17% and 6% by 2030 in rural and urban households respectively. In contrast, transports and 
services took 27% and 33% of total rural and urban households’ expenditure; both would 
increase to 39% and 44% by 2030 respectively. The consumption proportions for 
manufacturing products in both rural and urban areas would only change slightly. Our 
projection on consumption expenditures are 15,600 2002 RMB or 19,850 2002 US$ in PPP 
per urban dweller, and 3,613 2002 RMB or 4,600 2002 US$ in PPP per rural resident.  
 
Technical and structural change: We use the RAS technique to estimate the Leontief 
technical coefficients matrix (A matrix) for 2030 (Miller and Blair, 1985). RAS is a widely-
used method for updating an input-output table over a certain time period. The basic method 
is outlined in Miller and Blair (1985). We projected China’s annual GDP in 2030 as the main 
constraints in balancing the table, which would be 38 trillion 2002 RMB. The share of 
agriculture in GDP would drop from 12% to 3% by 2030, and the share of industry would 
stay at roughly 50% as now, and services would make up the remaining 47% in the target year, 
increased from the current 38%.   
 
Energy demand and fuel mix: We also adopted the energy demand and fuel mix assumptions 
of the International Energy Agency’s World Energy Outlook 2007. Given an average annual 
GDP growth rate of 5.6% from 2002 to 2030, China’s total final energy consumption would 
increase by 3.1% on average (International Energy Agency, 2007, Chapter 9). Total final 
consumption of coal would grow by 4.7% per year on average between 2005 and 2015, before 
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easing off between then and 2030, growing at under 1% per annum. Most of the increase in 
coal use comes from manufacturing sectors. Final gas consumption would increase nearly 
fourfold. Final oil demand would rise by 3.9% per year, driven mainly by transport; oil would 
account for 96% of total energy for transport in 2030, similar to today (International Energy 
Agency, 2007, Chapter 9). Demand for electricity would grow faster than for any other 
energy form, almost catching up to oil as the leading end-use fuel. Electricity use would 
increase more than threefold between 2005 and 2030 (International Energy Agency, 2007, 
Chapter 9), and about 70% of electricity consumption would be generated by coal-fired plants 
(International Energy Agency, 2007, Chapter 10). Although China has goals to increase 
shares of renewable energy in both the transport and electricity sectors, current trends show 
the short term goals are going unmet, and we adopt conservative assumptions for both sectors 
as in International Energy Agency (2007).  
 
Results:  
Our reference scenario suggests that in 2030 China’s total CO2 emissions would reach 11,900 
MMT; and its production-related emissions will more than double, from 4,800 MMT in 2005 
to 11,000 MMT in 2030. Residential direct emission will increase from 213 MMT to about 
900 MMT mainly due to the growth of gasoline consumption for private transportations. As 
shown in blue in Figure 3, by 2030, production-related CO2 emissions would increase by 
222% relative to the 2002 level. However, per capita consumption would drive an increase of 
362% in production-related CO2 emissions relative to the 2002 level keeping other factors 
constant, mainly resulting from the increase in urban household consumption. Efficiency 
improvements alone would offset just over half (193%) of that increase in emissions. The 
growth of population would lead to a 6% increase. Chinese economic structure would change 
significantly over the next 30 years as stated above. But the change of consumption structure 
alone would drive 5% increase of the emissions and the changes in production structure 
would increase the emissions by 42% above the 2002 level keeping other factors constant. 
The reason of both production and consumption structures being relatively weak drivers for 
emissions increase is that the GDP/consumption expenditures move from one low CO2 sector 
(e.g. agriculture) to another (e.g. services) while keeping a similar proportion of carbon-
intensive manufacturing sectors (e.g. electricity and machinery related products).  
 
If we broaden our timescale to encompass 50 years of Chinese economic development from 
the reforms of the early 1980s through 2030, China’s annual CO2 emissions would increase 
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over 9-fold. China’s CO2 emissions growth would be much faster than in many developed 
countries, which is partly due to different development stages. For example, annual CO2 
emissions in the US increased about 3 times, and 6 times for Japan, since the 1950s.  
 
The pattern of final consumers contributing to the increase in CO2 emissions in 2030 exhibits 
some notable changes compared with 2002 (Figure 2). Urban households replace capital 
investment as the largest contributor to increased emissions. In 2030, urban households are 
responsible for 49% of the 7,551 MMT increase in CO2 emissions, followed by capital 
investments at 33%. In the urban household sector, electricity production would still be the 
largest contributor to the increase of CO2 emissions, representing 20% of the total, assuming 
that China would still have a similar energy mix as today. Public transport and services such 
as banking, insurance, and education together rank as the second largest source for CO2 
emissions triggered by production for urban household consumption (17%). Due to the rapid 
increase in consumption of processed food by urban households and increasingly by rural 
households, food processing (with 14%) would overtake traditional agriculture to become the 
third largest CO2 emitter triggered by urban household consumption.  
 
In the capital investment sector, machinery production would replace construction as the 
largest CO2 emitter, contributing 62% of emissions in this sector by 2030. Construction would 
still contribute 22% of sectoral emissions. Increasingly, capital investments will take place in 
rural areas to improve antiquated infrastructure such as rail, road, water, and electricity as 
well as agricultural machinery.  
 
4.2 Westernizing lifestyles scenario 
This scenario is designed with particular focus on the driving forces of lifestyle changes and 
their contributions to CO2 emissions. Lifestyle change consists of changes in per capita 
consumption volume and changes in consumption patterns. In this scenario, we assume 
Chinese urban household consumption would grow more rapidly so as to achieve the current 
average US consumption patterns and expenditures of 2002 $25,000 in PPP terms by 2030, 
which is about 25% higher than in the reference scenario. This increase would require the 
income of every urban dweller to increase at a 5.9% per year over the 28 years from 2002. We 
keep the same trends for urban and rural income as our reference scenario. Therefore, the 
income of rural residents would increase at 5.4% annually from 2002 to 2030 with conversion 
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towards current urban households’ consumption pattern. To sustain these changes in lifestyles 
in both urban and rural households, Chinese GDP per capita would need to grow at an 
average of 6.4% through 2030, which is higher than the value of 5.6% in the reference 
scenario. The consumption pattern for 2030 would reflect a transition for China to a relatively 
more service-based economy. Services would account for 60% (compared to 47% in the 
reference scenario) overall GDP and the share of agriculture would drop to 2% by 2030 
(compared to 3% in our reference scenario). The driving forces of population (p) and the 
efficiency gains (F) are identical to our reference scenario. Due to the differences in final 
demand between the reference and lifestyle scenarios, we re-balanced the input-output table in 
2030 using the RAS technique. 
 
Results: 
Under the westernizing lifestyle scenario, China’s total emissions would reach 16,600 MMT 
by 2030, with production-related CO2 emissions reaching 13,600 MMT. This is 2,500 MMT 
or 24% more than in the reference scenario. As shown in the red series in Figure 3, keeping 
other factors constant, the change in per capita consumption would drive a 491% increase in 
CO2 emissions, which is 1.4 times higher than in the reference scenario. Efficiency gains 
could only offset 257% (i.e. about half) of the increase in CO2 emissions.  
 
Even though attaining US consumption levels would increase emissions, the current US 
consumption structure (the urban Chinese consumption pattern in 2030 in the westernizing 
lifestyle scenario) would be “cleaner” than the projected one in our reference scenario since 
US residents consume relatively more services and less manufacturing products compared 
with projected consumption by urban population of China in the reference scenario. For 
example, the average US household spends 5% of their total expenditures on processed food 
products, 4% on machinery, electrical and electronic goods, and 2% on clothes, but 21% on 
retailing, restaurants and hotels, and 56% on public transportation and other services (U.S. 
Bureau of Economic Analysis, 2008). By contrast, the projections for urban household 
expenditures in our reference scenario show much larger shares for manufactured and 
processed products including 11% on processed food, 17% on electrical goods, and 9% on 
clothes, with only 13% and 26% on retailing and public transport/other services, respectively. 
This phenomenon is also reflected in Figure 3, where the change in CO2 emissions due to 
consumption patterns would decrease emissions by 938 MMT or 28% of the total increase in 
this scenario if other driving forces stay constant, compared to the increase of 158 MMT or 
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5% relative to 2002’s CO2 emissions predicted by our reference scenario. However, the 
increase in direct emissions from private transportation sectors would be significant. For 
example, on average, each US household owned 1.9 cars and consumed 1,143 gallons (3.6 
tons) of gasoline in 2001. If we assume that every Chinese urban household by 2030 would 
drive the same amount as every American, direct gasoline consumption would increase 
emissions by about 3,000 MMT.    
 
The change in production structure would lead to an 87% increase in CO2 emissions, 
compared to a 42% increase under the reference scenario. One of the main reasons for this 
rise is that increased expenditure on services and transport would require greater energy 
consumption, including electricity and gasoline. The CO2 emissions from electricity 
production would almost double to 9,769 MMT, from 4,791 MMT in the reference case. The 
demand for public transport would be 2.5 times higher than in our reference scenario, 
however, that would not drive significant increase in petroleum extraction, refinery and 
distribution related emissions in China since 80% of China’s oil consumption would rely on 
imports (International Energy Agency, 2007, Chapter 10).  
 
Allocating the increase in CO2 emissions to the different final consumers, we find urban 
households are responsible for 48% of the total growth, followed by capital investments 
(30%), government (23%) and rural households (8%). Producing exports would result in 
3,925 MMT in increased emissions for China. The exports of machineries and other metal 
products would result in 1,459 MMT CO2, which would be almost one-third of total 
emissions from producing all exports. If it is assumed that China produces its own imports, 
then China would avoid 3,109 MMT of CO2 through imports. About 15% of this is in the 
extraction, refinery and distribution of oil and gas. The oil and gas would be primarily used in 
transportation sector; the combustion would result in about 3,000 MMT CO2 emissions as 
stated above. In this westernizing lifestyle scenario, the freight and passengers transport is 
projected to increase 5% of GDP from 2002 to 2030; further the private vehicles ownership 
for urban Chinese would increase from less than 2 in 2002 to 190 cars per 100 households by 
2030 (same as current US level).  
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4.3 Carbon dioxide capture and storage (CCS) scenario 
Technological innovations and improvements are one of the most effective ways of reducing 
CO2 emissions. Our historical results suggest that technological improvements would result in 
a 77% reduction in CO2 emissions in 1981 level over the past two decades if other driving 
forces had kept at the same level as in 1981. Such reductions in emissions are highly desirable 
given ongoing structural changes. For example, by 2030, electricity could occupy more than 
40% of China’s final energy consumption due to structural change toward services, and coal-
fired power plants would likely still dominate electricity as a whole, amounting to 70% ~ 80% 
of China’s electricity supply (International Energy Agency, 2007, Chapter 10). Geological 
storage of CO2 emissions from power plants could allow China to continue to use its abundant 
domestic coal reserves while reducing its CO2 emissions. Carbon dioxide capture and storage 
(CCS) technology can offset roughly 85% of carbon dioxide emissions from the power plants, 
enabling continued use of fossil fuels accompanied by large reductions in CO2 emissions. 
Much of the CCS technology is already demonstrated (IPCC, 2005), but still requires full 
scale implementation. As the leading emitter of CO2, China will come under increasing 
pressure to assume more responsibility for its emissions. Some Chinese businesses are already 
willing to take action. For example, China Huaneng Group, one of the largest energy 
companies in China is leading a consortium building China’s first integrated gasification 
combined cycle (IGCC) plant in Tianjin with 250 megawatts (MW) capacity by 2009 that will 
be expanded to 650 MW and fitted with capture and storage  (Xu and Gao, 2006; Zhao and 
Gallagher, 2007). However, broad implementation of CCS faces several problems such as 
efficiency loss, locating appropriate sequestration sites. The potential cost of CCS equipped 
power plants is probably the most crucial issue. A survey by Reiner et al. (2007) of more than 
100 Chinese key stakeholders found both government and industry respondents to be reluctant 
to invest heavily in CCS technology without significant outside investment. 
 
The uncertainties of CCS implementation make scenario development difficult. We decided 
to take a best-case scenario to give an upper limit of the mitigation potential of CCS in China. 
Our CCS scenario assumes the same economic and social conditions as our reference case. In 
order to sustain the economic growth, China’s total electricity generation would need to 
increase 8,627 terawatts hours (TWh) by 2030 (International Energy Agency, 2007) from 
2,866 TWh in 2006 (National Bureau of Statistics, 2007b). Currently coal-fired plants account 
for 83% of total electricity generation; and the figure would decrease to about 70% due to the 
increase in generation from natural gas, nuclear, hydro and other renewable energy sources 
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(International Energy Agency, 2007). The newly installed coal-fired plants would provide 
3,500 TWh of electricity generation, which accounts about 40% of the total generations by all 
coal-fired plants. This scenario assumes “best available technology” is imposed on coal 
consumption in the chemical, metal and construction materials production sectors and that all 
newly built coal-fired electricity generation would be fitted with CCS, eventually representing 
40% of coal-fired power plants in 2030. The other driving forces are kept the same as in our 
reference scenario. 
 
With CCS technology, the projected production-related CO2 emissions in 2030 would drop by 
44% to 6,100 MMT from 11,000 MMT in our reference scenario, which is still 1.8 times 
higher than 2002 emissions. As shown in the green series of Figure 3, efficiency gains would 
offset 272% of the increase of total production-related CO2 emissions while the change in per 
capita consumption would drive a 308% increase in CO2 emissions. Other driving forces had 
small effects: growth in population (5%), change in production structure (35%), and change in 
consumption patterns (4%).  
 
 
5 Discussion 
To date, China’s annual CO2 emissions have increased more than fourfold since the economic 
reforms began in 1978. Production-related emissions contributed the most to this increase. Per 
capita GDP growth was the major factor in driving the increase of Chinese CO2 emissions 
while efficiency gains reduced the emissions only partly. However, efficiency gains will be 
less effective if China continues to develop in a similar manner as it has in recent decades.  
 
Our reference scenario projects a threefold increase in production-related emissions in the 
next three decades above the 2002 level. Strikingly, our more radical projection on CO2 
emissions under a westernizing lifestyles scenario yields a fivefold emission growth if every 
urban Chinese would adopt a 2002 American lifestyle by 2030. Although there are concerns 
that US consumption is not sustainable, in fact US consumption patterns include larger shares 
of service sectors, which would be more “sustainable” than if Chinese consumption patterns 
simply followed its current trend, even after structural changes occurred. Efficiency and 
technology improvements will remain important in offsetting emissions (Peters et al., 2007). 
Importantly, even with the extremely optimistic scenario of the implementation of CCS on all 
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new coal-fired generation, China’s CO2 emissions will still increase about 80% by 2030 over 
2002 level.  
 
China is a non-Annex B country in the Kyoto Protocol and consequently does not have an 
emission reduction commitment for pre-2012 period. Although China’s annual CO2 emissions 
will then be the world’s largest in absolute terms, it is unlikely that China will take such a 
commitment in the near future (Adam, 2007; Zhang, 2000). Nevertheless, assuming that at 
this point China would commit to reduce its 2030 CO2 emissions to its 2000 level, China’s 
CO2 emission would need to drop more than 70%, from 11,900 MMT based on our reference 
scenario to about 3,200 MMT. This reflects the enormity of recent Chinese growth in carbon 
emissions. To ensure the same economic growth as our reference scenario and simultaneously 
achieve the emissions reduction target, all Chinese sectors that consume coal would be 
required to install CCS devices, or more than half of China’s energy would need to be 
supplied by renewable and nuclear energy, both of which seem unrealistic at the current time.  
 
Even with efficiency improvements and rapid penetration of the best available technology 
assumed in the CCS scenario, it is unlikely that China’s CO2 emissions can be reduced to the 
2000 level by 2030. Therefore further attention must be paid to the other driving forces, in 
particular structure changes in both production and consumption. Household consumption is 
playing an increasingly important role in the growth of CO2 emissions and urban households 
will be responsible for at least half of the emission growth in the future. It is unrealistic and 
would be considered unfair to limit Chinese households to consume in certain ways. However, 
policy choices could be useful in shifting the growing Chinese consumption toward more 
climate-friendly patterns by encouraging public transportation and energy efficiency in the 
home, imposing a carbon tax on automobiles and so on. Any policies, however, would require 
sufficient considerations of their implications on income inequality.  
 
Capital investment was the largest sector contributing to CO2 emissions growth in the past, 
and as the importance of capital investment decreases with development (Crosthwaite, 2000), 
its environmental impacts will likely decrease as well. Nevertheless, we estimate capital 
investments would still account for at least one quarter of total production-related emissions 
by 2030, particularly as infrastructure is developed in rural and western China. Construction 
and machinery production have been and will continue to be major CO2 emitters.   
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The growth in Chinese exports will continue to be an important question for the growth in 
Chinese emissions. This raises the question of where goods should be produced from an 
environmental perspective (Peters and Hertwich, 2008b). Many developed countries would 
have a comparative advantage in environmental terms to China in producing technology- and 
carbon-intensive products; and large amounts of emissions would be avoided if certain 
products were produced elsewhere and imported to China (Liu and Diamond, 2005). This 
does not imply Chinese exports are bad, rather, that the production systems and electricity 
system in China is dirtier than in many other competing countries. An increased focus of 
international trade in climate negotiations may increase pressure on China to improve its 
environmental profile to avoid isolation (Peters and Hertwich, 2008a; Wang and Watson, 
2007; Weber et al., 2008). Furthermore authorities of developed countries should take the lead 
on new low-carbon technologies developments collaborating with developing countries as 
well as implement incentives for their firms to accelerate spillovers of advanced energy 
technologies to developing countries.  
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